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4.1  Introduction 
Colombia is an interesting  country to study for this project because it 
has  experienced  both  import substitution  and  export  promotion  trade 
strategies  and  because  it  faces  severe  employment  problems.  From 
World War I1 until 1967, Colombia followed well-defined import substi- 
tution policies. During this period the Colombian manufacturing sector 
evolved from producing mostly consumer goods to producing intermedi- 
ate and capital goods as many import substitution industries developed. 
In this  environment, natural  resource  based  (NRB)  commodities  ac- 
counted for the bulk of  exports. In 1960 coffee accounted for 72 percent 
of  total exports, while manufactures made up only 2 percent of the total. 
In 1967, after  a balance  of  payments crisis, Colombia  changed the 
focus of  its trade policies. The change was not abrupt. Its purpose was 
to make the development of  export industries more attractive than the 
further development of  import  substitution industries.  However, at the 
same time, Colombia hoped that industries that had developed efficiently 
under the import substitution strategy would find it profitable to begin 
exporting. Thus the new policy was intended to improve the profitability 
of  export sales relative to domestic sales for new and existing producers. 
The resulting opening of  the economy was dramatic, and the composi- 
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tion  of  exports  changed  drastically.  By  1976, manufacturing  exports 
accounted for 21 percent of  total exports, and coffee’s share had fallen 
to less than 50 percent. 
Colombia’s employment problems are similar to those afflicting many 
other LDCs. Population growth has been rapid, with the urban popula- 
tion  rising  at an  even  more rapid  rate.  During its import substitution 
phase, growth of  manufacturing employment was dismal. In the last ten 
years  of  import substitution, manufacturing  employment  growth  aver- 
aged 1 percent per year. In its last five years, manufacturing output rose 
at an annual rate of  5.5  percent, but manufacturing employment did not 
increase at all. One of  the purposes of  the export promotion policy was 
to increase employment opportunities in the manufacturing  sector. To 
a certain degree this increase has occurred,  although it has not been as 
strong as that experienced  in some other countries. Since 1967, manu- 
facturing employment has been growing at annual rates of  3 to 4 percent. 
This growth is not as large as, say, that of  Brazil, which experienced in- 
creases  in manufacturing employment on the order  of  6 to  7 percent 
annually after adopting export promotion policies. 
Although  there have  been  extensive  studies of  the progress  of  the 
Colombian economy, its dependence upon coffee exports, and its import 
substitution  policies  (e.g.,  Berry  and  Thoumi  1977; Diaz-Alejandro 
19766; Thoumi 1978), there has been no study of  the employment ef- 
fects of  the export promotion  strategy.  Thus,  Colombia  should make 
an interesting comparison to other export-oriented countries largely be- 
cause its policies have been relatively less successful  (though certainly 
not unsuccessful) in generating employment opportunities. 
My analysis focuses upon the years 1970 and 1973.l Data availability 
was the primary reason for this choice. However, comparing labor re- 
quirements  between  the  two  years  will  permit  inferences  about  the 
progress  of  the export  promotion  policies  started  in  1967. The  1970 
estimates then  will  refer  to  the early  phase of  export promotion; the 
1973 estimate will refer to the later phase. 
4.2  An Overview of  the Colombian Economy 
4.2.1  Patterns of  Growth 
Colombia has many characteristics in common with other LDCS.~  Its 
per  capita income was  approximately  $630 in  1976, somewhat below 
the average for the “middle-income  developing countries” (MDC) esti- 
mated by the World Bank. Growth in real GNP during the past thirty 
years has averaged  approximately  5  percent per year,  although growth 
has  not been  smooth  by  any  means. From  1950 to 1956, growth in 
GNP averaged  5.23 percent; from  1956 to  1967, the  annual  average 137  Trade Strategies, Employment, and Income in Colombia 
growth rate fell to 4.57 percent; from  1967 to  1972, it  averaged  6.08 
percent. This rate has increased in more recent years to about 6.5 per- 
cent  (see Coyuntuva Econdmica, various issues), with the exception of 
1975, when GNP grew only  1.8 percent as a result of  the world reces- 
sion  and restrictive  internal  macroeconomic policies. The composition 
of  GNP has changed substantially  since, as formal manufacturing and 
services have  grown  at  a faster rate than  GNP, while agriculture has 
grown at a lower rate. The national accounts (Cuentas nacionales 1973, 
1977) indicate that agriculture’s share of  GNP declined from 35.9 per- 
cent in  1950 to 26.7 percent in  1972. Total manufacturing’s share, in- 
cluding the  informal  sector, grew from  17.8 percent  to  20.2  percent. 
Underlying this, the rate of  growth of  the formal manufacturing sector 
has consistently outpaced GNP by approximately 1  percent per year dur- 
ing the past fifteen years. The shares of  mining, personal services, gov- 
ernment services, and transport have remained  stable, while the shares 
of  commerce,  communications,  electricity,  gas  and  water,  construc- 
tion,  and  banking,  insurance,  financial,  and  real  estate  services have 
all  increased  significantly. Particularly  large  percentage  changes  took 
place  in  communications  and  electricity  and  other  utilities,  reflecting 
both  the  large  infrastructure  expenditures  by  the  government  in  the 
fifties  and  sixties  and  also  the  increased  degree  of  urbanization  and 
internal economic integration of  the country. 
4.2.2  International Trade 
Pattern and Composition of Trade 
Colombia’s exports  consist  principally  of  NRB products  (of  which 
coffee is the most  important), destined mainly for the developed  capi- 
talist  world. Its imports  are mostly  manufactured  goods,  again mainly 
originating from developed nations. However, it is perhaps not quite as 
dependent upon trade as some LDCs for its economic well-being and, to 
a degree,  has succeeded  in  diversifying both  the  composition  and  the 
destination of  its exports. 
Colombia’s international trade has grown at an accelerating rate since 
1960. Table 4.1 shows that commodity exports (in current prices)  rose 
by  16 percent between 1960 and 1965, by 35 percent between 1965 and 
1970, and by  102 percent during the following five years. Commodity 
imports behaved somewhat erratically; they declined 16  percent between 
1960 and  1965 and then increased sharply  as dollars became available 
because of  increased exports. During the  1960s the share of  exports in 
GNP fluctuated  between  12.8 and  14.3 percent,  and  that  of  imports 
ranged from 12.4 to 16.2 percent. More recently  (1976), official figures 
show a decline in  the share of  exports in GNP to 11.8 percent  and a 
decline  in  the share of  imports  to 12.0 percent.  These figures, which 138  Francisco E. Thoumi 
Table 4.1  Growth of  Colombia’s Foreign Trade, 1960 to  1975 (Values in 
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would mean a decline in the trade share in spite of  the export drive and 
simultaneous lowering of  tariffs, may be biased downward because con- 
traband has probably increased. 
Colombia has become less dependent upon NRB and coffee exports. 
In  1960, NRB commodities formed  98  percent  of  exports,  of  which 
coffee was 72 percent. In 1970 the share of  NRB commodities in total 
exports had fallen to about 85 percent; that for coffee was  64 percent. 
By  1973 NRB products formed 65 percent of  exports; coffee’s share had 
fallen yet further to 50 percent. 
The relative importance of  exports to developed nations has fallen at 
the same time that the relative shares of  NRB and coffee exports have 
fallen. In 1960,94 percent of  Colombia’s exports were destined for DCs, 
of  which the United States and Germany were most important. By  1975 
the DC share in total  exports had  decreased to 79 percent. Its major 
LDC  destinations  were  other  Latin  American  countries,  especially 
Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Venezuela. 
Colombian imports are mostly manufactured products and originate 
mostly in the developed countries (see tables 4.1 and 4.2). The course 
of  imports has not changed much in the past  twenty years, about  87 
percent of  imports originating in DCs. However, the relative share of 
the United States fell from 50 percent in the early 1960s to 46 percent 
in 1970 and 41 percent in 1973, while that of  other DCs rose from 35 
percent to 40 and 44 percent in the same time periods. The content of 
imports has also remained relatively stable. Manufactured imports were 
95 percent of  all imports in the early 1960s, 94 percent in 1970, and 89 
percent in 1973. 
It has been argued (Diaz-Alejandro 19766) that the export promotion 
policies followed by  the  Colombian government have benefited NRB 139  Trade Strategies, Employment, and Income in Colombia 
products,  which probably would have been exported independently of 
the export promotion  policies-for  example, cotton, sugar, coffee, to- 
bacco, and bananas. However, the substantial increase in the importance 
of HOS exports in the 1970s indicates that the export promotion policies 
have affected HOS exports more than NRB exports. In general, growth 
rates (of the value of  exports) for NRB exports have been lower than 
those for HOS exports despite booming world markets for NRB com- 
modities (e.g., the export price of  Colombian coffee increased by  close 
to 200 percent between 1970 and  1975). It seems clear then that HOS 
exports have been  more  responsive to  domestic price incentives than 
NRB commodities, whose exports depend upon  weather  and  interna- 
tional price fluctuations. 
Although HOS exports grew across the board, their most substantial 
growth  was  in  exports to  developed  countries other  than  the  United 
States. Exports to these countries increased ninefold to exceed the ex- 
ports to the United States by 26 percent when HOS is defined to include 
a11  the manufacturing sector, and by  90 percent when the HOS defini- 
tion  excludes petrochemicals, jewelry,  and  sugar. The share of  HOS 
exports going to the United States declined by over 15 percentage points 
between  1970 and  1973 under the different HOS definitions used  (see 
table 4.2). The share going to other developed countries increased by 
about  20 percentage points. The share  of  LDCs in HOS  exports de- 
creased by  about  8 percentage points when  sugar, petrochemicals, and 
jewelry  are included in the HOS  sector and  by  about 5.5 percentage 
points when these products are excluded. 
Table 4.2 also shows the share of  HOS goods in total exports in 1970 
and 1973. The striking feature is the dramatic increase of  HOS exports 
as a percentage of  total exports to nearly all destinations, with the most 
significant increases being  in  the  HOS  share of  exports to  other  de- 
veloped countries, the Andean Group, and other Latin American coun- 
tries. Their share of  HOS exports in total exports increased from  14.9 
percent to 35.5 percent when all manufacturing except sugar is defined 
as the HOS sector and from 12.7 percent to 29.9 percent when all food 
manufacturing is excluded from the HOS category. They increased their 
shares in other DC exports from 3.5 to 30.2 percent, in Andean Group 
exports from 36.3 to 78.5 percent, and in other Latin American exports 
from 36.4 to 54.6 percent. 
The evidence thus suggests that the switch in trade policies that im- 
proved the relative attractiveness of  exports after 1967 had a cumulative 
effect. In the early post-1967 years many NRB exports benefited from 
the export incentives system, while the effect of  these policies on HOS 
exports was not being fully felt. However, as time passed without drastic 
changes in export oriented policies, entrepreneurs gained confidence in Table 4.2  Colombian Exports and Imports by  Country Groupings and Share of  HOS Goods in Exports, 1970 and 1973 
Other  Central 
Devel-  America  Other 
oped  and  Latin  Other Less 
United  Coun-  Vene-  Andean  Carib-  American  Developed  Socialist 
States  tries  zuela  Group  bean  Countries  Countries  Countries  Total 
Country Distribution of  Trade (%) 
Total exports  1970  39.0  39.0  .9  7.3  3.6  2.1  .2  .7  100 
1973  36.5  43.6  1.8  5.6  6.6  1.8  .4  3.7  100 
HOS exports-  1970  43.3  14.5  4.5  15.7  17.0  4.6  .2  .1  100 
all manufactures  1973  27.8  35.3  4.2  11.5  14.8  2.7  .7  3.0  100 
HOS exports excluding sugar,  1970  32.1  12.5  6.0  19.6  22.1  6.1  1.1  .5  100 
petrochemicals, and jewelry  1973  17.2  33.0  6.3  17.2  21.0  4.0  .9  .4  100 
Total imports  1970  46.4  39.5  1.1  4.3  .9  4.4  .8  2.6  100 
1973  41.0  43.5  .7  4.0  .9  7.0  1.2  1.7  100 
Manufactured imports  1970  47.1  41.1  1.1  3.3  1  .o  3.4  .3  2.7  100 
1973  37.7  47.7  .8  4.0  .8  6.6  .5  1.9  100 
Share of  HOS Exports in Total Exports (%) 
HOS exports 
excluding sugar 
1970  15.4  3.5  81.5  36.3  80.9  36.4  51.8  9.6  14.9 
1973  25.6  30.2  88.5  78.5  85.0  54.6  50.2  2.8  35.5 
HOS exports excluding  1970  13.3  3.2  69.2  30.2  66.0  34.7  51.5  7.1  12.7 
all processed foods  1973  23.2  23.5  71.9  67.0  73.3  53.9  49.2  2.0  29.9 
Source:  Computations derived from DANE (1970-73,  1970; see Appendix A). These computations  are hereafter  referred  to as “author’s 
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the stability of  these policies and began to invest in manufacturing plants 
to supply world  markets.  The full  effect of  this process  had not been 
felt by  1970; thus the large increase in manufactured exports between 
1970 and 1973. 
Balance of Payments 
Balance  of  payments  problems  have  frequently  shaped  Colombia’s 
trade policies. During its import substitution phase,  Colombia typically 
encountered  balance  of  payments  difficulties  (see  table  4.3). Policy- 
makers responded to these problems by  increasing import licensing, in- 
troducing multiple exchange rates, and generally tightening the stringency 
of exchange controls. The change in policy directions of  1967 was itself 
partially due to a balance of  payments crisis. In mid-1965, foreign ex- 
change reserves were down to $56 million, their lowest level since 1957 
and half that of  a year earlier. From 1965 to 1966, merchandise imports 
rose (in current terms) by nearly 50 percent while exports fell by 6 per- 
cent. Reserves fell still further. A crisis ensued, and after consultation 
with  domestic  and  international  officials  the  exchange  system  was 
changed to a crawling peg (as characterized by Diaz-Alejandro 1976b, p. 
206), and the nature of  the trade regime was altered substantially. 
The Exchange Rate 
Colombia has used a multiple exchange rate system3 since World War 
I1 with periodic changes in rates and classifications of  different exports 
and imports. In some periods, various rates have been allowed to float. 
In general, it can be said that the peso was consistently overvalued and 
that  exports were  discriminated  against during the  import  substitution 
phase,  although  the degree  of  overvaluation varied  as  exchange  rates 
Table 4.3  Colombian Balance of  Payments, 1957-74  (Annual Averages in 
Millions of  Current U.S. Dollars) 
1957-62  1963-66  1967-70  1971-74 
1.  Coffee exports 
2.  Merchandise exports 
3. Merchandise imports 
4.  Trade balance 
5. Net services and transfers 
6.  Current account balance 
7.  Net long-term capital 
8.  Net short-term capital 
9.  Errors 
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adjusted infrequently in the face of  chronic inflation. Since 1967 the de- 
gree of  overvaluation  has fallen.  Hutcheson  and Schydlowsky (1976) 
indicate that it was about 25 percent. 
The average annual rate of  inflation for  1961-72  was  11.25 percent 
(Gomez-Otalora  and Pardo-Vargas  1973). Inflation  accelerated to 24 
percent in  1973, then 26 percent in  1974, and declined to 18 percent 
in  1975 (see Coyunturu Econdmicu  1  [April  19761:  36). Growth of 
the  money  supply  resulting  from  continued  large  budget  deficits  is 
probably  the main cause of  inflation  (see Barro 1973). For example, 
the money  supply in  1972 was twenty-five times greater than it was in 
1960, while the government ran  annual budget  deficits exceeding 800 
million pesos over the period. 
The Trade Regime 
After World War 11,  Colombia’s international reserves diminished as 
the demands for many commodities not available during the war were 
satisfied. Simultaneously, coffee prices declined and the government re- 
acted to the ensuing balance of  payments problems with a combination 
of  devaluations  and protectionist policies  favoring industrial  develop- 
ment and penalizing agriculture. A boom in coffee prices from 1953 to 
1956 allowed  consumer goods imports  to increase.  Thus, competition 
for some domestic industries increased, but the fundamentally protection- 
ist  policies  continued  to  encourage  many  new  industries  under  the 
umbrella  of  cheap foreign  exchange  obtained  from coffee, which  was 
used to import machinery, technology, and intermediate goods. A preci- 
pitous fall in coffee prices from one dollar a pound in September 1956 to 
approximately thirty-five cents per  pound in 1961 caused still more re- 
strictions to be placed on imports. 
In 1960 tariff  laws were thoroughly revised.  In effect the tariff  was 
“modernized”; that is,  a tariff  structure was developed following some 
rules that rationalized the tariff already in existence, which had resulted 
from changes induced by balance of  payments problems, specific lobby- 
ists’ pressures, and government priorities. Specific tariffs were abolished 
almost completely  and a system of  ad valorem tariffs was established, 
which  increased  “rationally”  as the “degree  of  elaboration  of  a  com- 
modity and its technological complexity” increased. The tariff structure 
was complemented by the creation of  three lists in which all tariff items 
were  classified:  prohibited,  license-required,  and free  (no license  re- 
quired) imports.  The composition of  these  lists varied,  depending on 
short-term  balance  of  payment  conditions.  In times  of  difficulty, the 
prohibited import list grew as the free list de~lined,~  and vice versa. 
Protection was also provided by  indirect protective measures, such as 
prior  import  deposits,  which  were  introduced  as an  anti-inflationary 
policy aimed at controlling the money supply. Another important pro- 143  Trade Strategies, Employment, and Income in Colombia 
tectionist  measure  was  the “law  of  basic  industries,”  which  gave  an 
income tax exemption to  firms using  intermediate goods produced  by 
Paz-del-Rio,  the  government-supported  steel  mill  that  had  been  in 
operation for a few years with a dismal record. 
Trade policies had some interesting loopholes; for example, the tariff 
did not apply to imports by the government and by the Catholic church. 
Furthermore, any importer attempting to bring in a “complete produc- 
tion process” could  apply for a “global license” that would  establish  a 
single tariff  for  all the machinery  and equipment imported.  Since the 
tariff  would  be determined by that  of  “the machine that characterized 
the process,” importers had a good idea of  which tariff they could obtain 
and thus would  apply for global licenses only if  they expected a lower 
rate. 
The general incentive system also included price controls, mostly on 
agricultural commodities, and capital subsidies. The latter were applied 
through portfolio requirements and interest-rate ceilings imposed on the 
banking system. 
By the early 1960s the “easy import substitution” period was nearly 
over.  To continue the import  substitution process,  it was necessary to 
develop intermediate and capital goods industries, many of  them capital- 
intensive (e.g.,  the chemicals and petrochemical industries absorbed 25 
percent  of  total  investment  in  manufacturing  from  1962  to  1967; 
Thoumi  1971). The government participated  heavily  in the industrial 
development  at  this  stage,  mainly  through  the Instituto  de Foment0 
Industrial (IFI), whose assets skyrocketed in constant 1958 pesos from 
35 million in 1958 to 1,962 million in 1972 (Thoumi 1978). The IFI’s 
investments were coordinated with private sector projects; it undertook 
projects  complementary  to  private  sector  investments  that  were  not 
developed by private firms because of  their high risk or the large amount 
of  capital needed. 
In summary, by  1967 Colombia had an incentive structure that pro- 
vided heavy protection to the manufacturing sector, penalized the agri- 
cultural sector, provided higher protection to finished products and con- 
sumer goods than to unfinished products and capital goods, but which 
did not exclude the possibility of  heavily protecting specific intermediate 
and capital goods industries through protection of  individual plants and 
which penalized employment creation in man~facturing.~ 
After  the balance  of  payments  crisis  of  1966,  trade  policies  were 
thoroughly altered. The main features of  the new policies were a com- 
mitment to generating exports of  manufactures and an abandonment of 
the fixed exchange rate policy. Decree 444 was the major policy tool. It 
allowed the president to change the exchange rate periodically, creating, 
in practice, a crawling-peg system. A set of  export incentives was also 
created. These included a flat 15  percent subsidy granted on the value 144  Francisco E. Thoumi 
of  “nontraditional”  exports,6 the extension of  credit for exporters, and 
the establishment of  a legal framework that regulated the establishment 
of  free zones. Simultaneously,  the government made a commitment to 
simplify  the  bureaucratic  requirements  of  the temporary  import  and 
tariff  drawback  systems that had  been in  existence for some time but 
were not operating efficiently. 
As I mentioned  earlier, the policy change was not a clear shift from 
import substitution industrialization to export oriented industrialization. 
Import substitution manufactures  had large investments  and had  been 
supplying most of  the manufactured consumer goods available in Colom- 
bia. The new policies were not aimed at forcing those industries to com- 
pete  with  imports  in  the  domestic  markets.  Nominal  protection  and 
import restrictions  remained  at a high level. However, the profitability 
of  export  oriented  activities  became  more  attractive  relative  to  that 
aimed at supplying the domestic market. New export industries were de- 
veloped, and industries that had developed efficiently under import sub- 
stitution policies were  encouraged to expand output for exports. 
4.2.3  Labor Market 
Employment  creation  has  been  perceived  as  a  major  problem  in 
C~lombia.~  Its population  growth  rate was high, with intercensal data 
showing a  3.12  percent  annual population  growth  rate  for  1951-64, 
followed by a 2.82 percent growth rate for 1964-73. 
Population  growth has been  accompanied  by substantial rural-urban 
migration  and  one of  the highest  rates  of urbanization  in  the world.* 
The Colombian population was 69.1 percent rural in  1938 and became 
60.9 percent  urban  in  1973. The urban  population  grew  at a rate of 
5.36 percent per year between  1951 and  1964 and at the lower rate of 
3.74 percent between  1964 and 1973. Urbanization has encompassed at 
least thirty cities. Bogot6 has increased its share of  the total population 
from 5.8 percent in 1951  to 12.2  percent in 1973. However, this increase 
has  not  made  Bogot6  significantly bigger  relative  to  other  cities,  for 
they have increased their population shares in similar proportions. 
Contrasted with these high rates of  urban population  growth, manu- 
facturing employment has grown rather slowly. From 1956 to  1966 it 
grew at an annual average rate of  1 percent. Thereafter it has averaged 
about 3 percent annually. However, that higher rate has been insufficient 
to absorb even the natural rate of  population increase, much less immi- 
grants to urban areas. 
Urban  open  unemployment  in  Colombia  thus  was  high  by  MDC 
standards,  although  not  abnormally  high  by  LDC levels. As  in  most 
LDCs, unemployment data are difficult to evaluate, since time-series data 
are hard to come by  and, when  found, are not rigorously  comparable 
through  time.  A  recently  published  series  (Asociacih  Nacional  de 145  Trade Strategies, Employment, and Income in Colombia 
Institucihes Financieras  1976)  that  puts  together  data  for  Bogota, 
Medellin, Cali, and Barranquilla from  1963 to 1976 shows rising open 
unemployment in Bogota between  1963 (7.9 percent)  and  1967 (12.2 
percent), followed by a period  of  declining unemployment to 6.8 per- 
cent in 1972. Then there was a sharp rise to 11.9 percent in June 1974, 
followed by a milder drop to 8.5 percent in October  1975 and  an in- 
crease to 10.1 percent in February 1976. During this same period, open 
unemployment in Medellin was more stable, ranging from a low of 10.8 
percent in 1965 to a high of  14.2 percent in 1972. Open unemployment 
rates in Cali and Barranquilla are chronically substantially higher than 
the ones of  Bogota,  averaging 40 percent to 60 percent more. Recent 
work by  Berry  (1975) shows that  a substantial number of  the openly 
unemployed in the cities are city-born, have higher than average educa- 
tion,  and  are under  thirty  years  of  age. Apparently,  members  of  this 
group have some means  of  subsistence  (family)  and  are unemployed 
because they are not able to find jobs that satisfy their expectations. 
Disguised unemployment in  the cities has also apparently been high. 
The  International  Labor  Organization  (ILO)  report  on  Colombia 
(1970) points  out that the participation  rates in  the labor force tend 
to be lower in Colombia than in other Latin American countries, find- 
ings that suggest a substantial level of  disguised unemployment. The ILO 
rough estimates put the urban disguised unemployment level somewhere 
around  13 percent.  Rural open  and disguised  unemployment  are also 
believed to be high, but no data exist on the subject. 
Poverty is  a bigger issue in Colombia than unemployment,  not only 
because of  the low income per capita, but  also because of  the concen- 
tration of  income. Berry and Urrutia  (1975) estimated that in 1964 the 
wealthiest  10 percent of  urban population  (excluding absentee landlords 
who  reside  in  urban  centers)  received  approximately  43 percent  of 
urban income, and the richest  1 percent  received  12 percent. 
Income distribution in rural areas is still more concentrated; the rich- 
est 10 percent received 51 percent of  the income, and the top 1 percent 
got 23 percent. In the urban  areas the poorest 40 percent got only 9.5 
percent  of  the income, while in  the  rural  areas the comparable group 
took  approximately  12 percent of  the income. 
Real wages in the manufacturing sector rose during the import substi- 
tution  and  early  export promotion periods.  They were  3.55 pesos per 
hour  (1970 prices)  in  1958, 5.73 pesos  per hour in  1967, and  6.66 
pesos per hour in 1971. Thereafter, they have fallen to 5.49 pesos per 
hour in  1975, the latest year for which data are available. 
Real wages are affected in the formal sector by an array of  legislative 
measures, which include minimum wage regulation, paid holidays, lay- 
off  costs, transport subsidies, paid vacations, paid holidays, contribution 
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and a Christmas bonus equal to one month’s salary if  the employee has 
worked  the  full year  (or a fraction  of  a month’s  salary equal to the 
proportion of  the year worked). All these legal fringe benefits amount 
to approximately 40 percent of  the salary base. 
All  large  manufacturing  firms  pay  the  legal  fringes, and  in  many 
instances they provide extra ones such as education and food subsidies. 
It is widely believed that small firms escape payment of  some of  the legal 
fringe benefits. 
The effect of  the minimum wage legislation is extremely difficult to 
determine, since changes in the legislated minima have frequently lagged 
inflation increases, and thus minimum levels set by the government have 
been below prevailing wages at times. 
4.2.4  The Structure of  Production 
The Colombian manufacturing sector, the focus of  this study, forms a 
sizable share of  GDP (about 20 percent). Industries classified as export- 
ables  (see section 4.4 below)  generated about 52 percent of  domestic 
value added in manufacturing (in 1970) and employed about 53 per- 
cent of  the manufacturing labor force. Industries classified as importables 
generated 38 percent of  manufacturing value added and employed 36 
percent of  its labor force. Production not competing with imports gen- 
erated 10 percent of  manufacturing value added and employed 10 per- 
cent of  the labor force. 
4.3  Effective Protection in Colombia 
The  most  rigorous studies of  effective  protection  in  Colombia  are 
Hutcheson (1973) and the revised study by Hutcheson and Schydlowsky 
(  1976)  .s Their estimates include effects of  quotas, subsidies, currency 
overvaluation, and other government interferences in trade. The Corden 
method was used and price comparisons were made when appropriate. 
Their estimates, protection on domestic sales,  are given  in  table 4.4. 
Note that in general the ERPs, contrary to what is normally expected, 
tend to be lower than  the nominal protection figures. This is because 
the ERPs adjust for currency overvaluation. These estimates indicate 
that ERPs were negative for coffee and mining and low for processed 
foods,  construction  materials,  and  “simple” intermediate goods; they 
were somewhat higher for beverages and tobacco, “complex” intermedi- 
ate  goods, and  machinery, and  higher still for nondurable  consumer 
goods, durable consumer goods, and transportation  equipment. Thus, 
protection for domestic sales retained the cascaded effect found in the 
import substitution period. Separate calculations of  simple average ERPs 
for our trade categories (discussed in section 4.4 below)  correspond to 
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Table 4.4  Nominal and Effective Protection in the Manufacturing Sector, 
1969 
Aggregated Groupings 
Nominal  Effective 
Protection  Protectiona 
~~~~ 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
Noncoffee agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
Mining 
Processed foods 
Processed foods excluding sugar 
Beverages and tobacco 
Construction materials 
Intermediate products I (“simple”) 
Intermediate products I1 (“complex”) 
Nondurable consumer goods 
Durable consumer goods 
Machinery 
Transportation equipment 
All primary products 
All manufactures 
All manufactures excluding beverages and tobacco 
All manufactures excluding sugar 
All sectors 
All sectors excluding coffee, mining, and sugar 
All exports 
All exports excluding coffee, mining, and sugar 
All manufactured exports excluding sugar 
-12.3% 
2.3 
-  9.0 






































-  16.5 
26.0 
34.1 
Source:  Hutcheson  and Schydlowsky  ( 1976)  and Hutcheson’s  unpublished  data. 
Appendix table 4.A.1  shows nominal  and  effective protection  rates for the disag- 
gregated manufacturing  sector  (four digits).  See also the note  to table 4.A.1  for 
the effect of  currency overvaluation on the relative  levels of  nominal  and effective 
protection rates. All weights are international  value  added. 
Corden method of  computation  employed. 
as exportables for purposes of  estimating labor requirements in 1970  was 
10 percent; that for importables was 22 percent; and that for noncompet- 
ing importable  production  was  52 percent.  All estimates  refer to pro- 
tection on domestic sales. Exportables tended to fall into the processed 
food, construction materials, and “simple” intermediate products groups, 
while  noncompeting  importable  production  was  likely  to  fall  in  the 
machinery and transportation equipment groups. There were differences 
between the effective protection rates in the domestic and foreign markets 
(not shown in table 4.4)  owing to the effect of  price controls, especially 
in  the  food  sector,  and  the subsidies of  the export  incentive  system. 
Exports of  processed foods were highly protected while exports of  con- 
struction  materials  and simple intermediate products  were mildly sub- 
sidized, as were the average manufactured  products.  A  comparison of 
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in  1969 was more attractive than the export markets for industries pro- 
ducing  capital  goods,  intermediate  products,  nondurable  and  durable 
consumer goods,  and transportation equipment. The opposite was true 
of  construction materials and processed foods, except beverages and to- 
bacco.  Thus,  activities  classified  as  exportables  below  (section  4.4) 
tended to have higher ERPs on export sales relative to domestic sales. 
However,  activities  classified as importables had  higher  ERPs in do- 
mestic  markets  than those  for exportables  and importables  in foreign 
markets. Thus, while importables received incentives to export, the re- 
strictions on imports  in  the  domestic  market  continued  to  make  it  a 
more attractive place to sell. 
Since this study focuses upon  1970 and  1973, it is important to note 
how policy changes in 1970-73  might have altered these 1969 estimates. 
First, the crawling-peg exchange system was maintained, thus keeping 
the real exchange rate at a fairly constant level (see Coyuntura Econb 
mica, various issues).  Therefore the degree of  currency  overvaluation 
probably  was  unchanged.  Likewise,  the  export  incentive  system  was 
maintained, but  the  export subsidy was raised  to 20 percent in  1972. 
Export ERPs would have increased thereafter. 
The general  trend  toward  a  more  open  economy  continued;  many 
commodities  were  transferred  from  the  prohibited  list  to the license- 
required  list, and many  others moved from the license-required  to the 
free list. The number of  import license applications approved increased; 
by  the end  of  1973 more  than  90 percent  were  approved.  Comple- 
mentary  to  the  relaxation  of  licensing  policies,  the  average  level  of 
tariffs was  Icwered.  These trends  suggest that  protection  on domestic 
sales would have fallen. 
In 1969 Colombia joined the Andean Common Market. The Andean 
Group’s policies have emphasized the coordinated development of  new 
industries and have  deemphasized  trade in  products  already manufac- 
tured  in the region  before the  Common Market’s  creation.  Protection 
within  the Common  Market  thus  would  have  increased  export ERPs 
for exports whose major destination is the Andean Group. Between 1970 
and 1973 (see table 4.2),  exports to the Andean Group did not increase 
as rapidly as exports in general. This was true for both NRB and HOS 
exports.  However, the share  of  HOS  exports  in  total  Andean  Group 
exports  rose  dramatically,  so it  is  likely  that  export  ERPs  for HOS 
goods  in  Andean  trade  increased.  Nonetheless,  the  overall  extent 
of  this increase probably was small since the Andean Group absorbed 
so little (15 percent)  of  Colombia’s HOS exports. 
Finally, the Pastrana government, which took office in the middle of 
1970, changed  the overall thrust  of  Colombia’s development strategy. 
It assigned first  priority  to  the  expansion  of  the construction  sector. 
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industries lost their privileged position as resources were diverted from 
the  import  substitution  sector  to construction.  These  changes  would 
imply a reduction in ERPs for import substitutes and for domestic sales 
in general. 
To summarize,  in  1969 the  structure  of  protection  (for domestic 
sales)  retained  its cascaded  effect from the import substitution  phase, 
although the degree of  cascading was probably lower. Protection in ex- 
port  markets was  provided  all HOS  manufactures.  Those  later  classi- 
fied  as  exportables  for  purposes  of  calculating  labor  requirements 
naturally  had higher ERPs on foreign sales than domestic sales. While 
importables received  some incentives to export,  they  were  more  pro- 
tected in domestic than foreign markets. 
Changes in  the trade regime  since 1969 probably had the net effect 
of  increasing protection somewhat on exports and decreasing protection 
on import sales. Major causes of  these changes were an increase in the 
export subsidy, a continued relaxation of  import controls, and a general 
decrease in tariff  rates. 
4.4  Factor Proportions in Colombian Trade 
4.4.1  Sectoral Classification 
For Colombia it was possible to undertake the analysis of  factor pro- 
portions in trade on the basis of  a four-digit ISIC-I1 classification. For 
the industries where foreign trade was not negligible, trade is classified 
according to the T statistic, defined in the introductory  chapter as fol- 
lows:  if  T < 0, the industry was classified as a producer of  exportable 
goods; if  0 < T < 0.4, the industry was defined as a producer of  import- 
competing goods; if  0.4 < T < 1.0, the industry was  defined as a pro- 
ducer of  non-import-competing  goods. The value of  0.4 was chosen to 
separate the import-competing from the non-competing import industries 
because there  were  few  industries  for which  the  T  statistic was  close 
to 0.4.1° When foreign trade was negligible, the industry was defined as 
a producer of  nontraded commodities. 
The agriculture and mining sectors were unambiguously  classified as 
NRB. Various  alternative classifications were  employed for the manu- 
facturing  sector  to  account for the fact  that some HOS  activities  are 
NRB-related. The first classification categorized all manufacturing activi- 
ties as HOS. The second eliminated sugar refining. The third eliminated 
all food manufacturing (classifying those activities as NRB) . The fourth 
eliminated  sugar,  petrochemicals,  and  jewelry  (all defined  as  NRB) . 
Finally,  a fifth  eliminated all food manufacturing,  petrochemicals,  and 
jewelry. Use  of  these  alternative classifications was  motivated  by  par- 
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processing branches, there is a question whether they need to be located 
near the raw material  source. Petrochemicals raise a similar question. 
The jewelry branch  is unique because of  losses  (stealing)  of  govern- 
ment  output and repeated  exporting of  the same gems to collect the 
export subsidy  (see below). These phenomena cast considerable doubt 
on the reliability of  the jewelry statistics. 
The T statistic was computed for both 1970 and 1973 with the classi- 
fications of  exportable,  import-competing,  and  non-competing goods 
varying substantially between the two years. Of  the seventy-eight tradable 
manufacturing industries, sixteen  switched  classification. These  indus- 
tries accounted for  19 percent of  total manufacturing value added in 
1970. Nine import-competing industries in 1970 became exporters, while 
four  industries went  the opposite way.  Two non-competing industries 
turned  into import-competing, and  one import-competing turned  into 
non-competing. These changes are shown in table 4.5 below. That the 
largest change in classification was from import-competing to exporting 
reflects policy changes between  1970 and  1973 which made exporting 
more attractive relative to import substitution. 
For this study, I decided to use the classification resulting from the 
1973 data, despite the fact that international markets were exceptional 
Table 4.5  Changes from 1970 to 1973 in Classification of Industries by 
Major Trade Categories 
1970 import-competing industries turned exporters by 1973 
3 11  1  Meat products 
3 122 Animal feeds 
3 140 Tobacco 
3212 Made-up textiles 
3  2 15 Cordage and rope 
33 19 Other wood and cork products 
3412 Containers and boxes of  paper and paperboard 
3691 Structural clay products 
3812 Metal furniture and fixtures 
1970 export industries turned import-competing by 1973 
3  113 Canning of  fruits and vegetables 
3  116 Grain mill products 
3  119 Cocoa and chocolate products 
3219 Other textiles 
1970 noncompeting industries turned import-competing by 1973 
3710 Iron and steel basic industries 
3841 Shipbuilding and repairing 
1970 import-competing industry turned noncompeting by 1973 
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in that year. This year is likely to be a better reflection of  the present 
economy, since the trend toward a more open economy has continued. 
The classification of two industries, however, was modified. According to 
the trade statistics, refined petroleum  and petroleum and coal products 
were  net  exports  in  1973, owing  to  a  Colombian  government  policy 
that until very recently kept oil prices at the lowest level in the world. 
Colombia’s oil production has dwindled, however, and today Colombia 
has  become  a net  importer of  oil products.  Furthermore,  in the early 
1970s  the  petrochemical  industries  were  net  exporters,  since  they 
were  exporting  at  marginal  costs  products  from  domestic  plants  that 
were larger than needed by the domestic market. These “excess capacity” 
exports have disappeared. For these reasons, the refining and petrochemi- 
cal  industries  are here  classified  as  import-competing  rather  than  as 
exporting. 
It should be noted  that this study deals only indirectly with the agri- 
cultural,  mining,  and  services  sectors  of  the  economy.  The lack  of 
meaningful data  (see Appendix A) constrains any comprehensive em- 
pirical  study  of  those sectors.ll  This omission  means that conclusions 
reached  herein  are valid  primarily  for  the  manufacturing  sector.12 It 
should also be noted  that  changes over time in average labor or skill 
ratios reflect changes in the relative size, and weight, of  the components 
of  the trade flows distinguished  and not changes in  factor inputs  into 
individual  industries.  This  follows from the fact that  (as reported  in 
Appendix A) the basic input and output data used  are all for the year 
1970. 
The following activities were classified as major HOS exportables (see 
appendix table 4.A.1 for their respective ISIC codes and table 4.6 for 
factor intensities : meat, dairy products, fish packing, bakery, sugar, and 
prepared  animal feeds  among the food processing industries; tobacco; 
all  textile  branches  with  the  exception  of  the small  “other  textiles”; 
apparel, shoes, and fur and leather and their products; wood  and cork 
products; cardboard containers; tires and tubes; pottery, glass, structural 
clay products, and cement; metal furniture; and jewelry. Most of  these 
classifications  are expected,  but  a  few  comments  are in order.  Card- 
board  containers are exported mostly as packing for other exports, but 
they  are classified separately so that the cardboard  box producer  can 
collect the export subsidy. Tires have been exported to South and Central 
America since the early 1960s. These exports have not been continuous, 
since  they  tend  to  occur  when  the  domestic  producers  have  excess 
capacity  owing  to  large  indivisibilities  in  production.  Structural  clay 
products and cement are exported from the northwest coast of  Colombia 
to the  Caribbean  countries,  since their  transportation  costs  are lower 
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Table 4.6  Factor Intensities in Major HOS Exportable and Importable 
Production, 1970 
Total  Direct  Ratio Male  Per- 
Labor  Labor/  to Female  centage 
Remuner-  Domestic  Blue-  of Labor 
ation/  Value Added  Collar  Force 
ISIC  Value  (Man-Years/  Employ-  Blue- 
Industry  Code  Added  Million Pesos)  ment  Collar 
Exporta bles 
Bakery products  3117  .51 
Sugar  3118  .87 
Food products n.e.c.  3121  .34 
Tobacco  3140  .14 
Spinning, weaving  3211  .36 
Knitting mills  3213  .71 
Cotton fabrics  3216  56 
Wearing apparel  3220  .52 
Nonmetallic mineral 
products n.e.c.  3699  .46 
Importables 
Grain mill products  3116  .15 
Pulp and paper  3411  .48 
Printing and publishing  3420  .62 
Drugs  3522  .52 
Soap and cosmetics  3523  .43 
Iron and steel  3710  .69 

















































Source:  Calculated from data outlined in Appendix A. 
Note:  “Major” means more than 300 million pesos of  domestic value added. 
in general with what one can a priori define as labor-intensive branches, 
with the exception of  sugar, glass, cement, and rubber tires. 
The import-competing industries are: canning, oils and fats, grain mill 
products, and candy and other foods among the food processors; wine 
and hard  alcohol; “other textiles”; pulp and paper and their products; 
printing; paints, medicines, and soaps and cosmetics; petroleum refining 
and its derivatives; rubber products except tires and tubes; plastic prod- 
ucts;  other  nonmetallic  minerals;  iron  and steel;  cutlery,  hand  tools, 
and  general  hardware;  structural  metal  products;  fabricated  metal 
products;  other  electrical  apparatus; shipbuilding,  bicycles,  and  other 
transportation  equipment;  and  manufacturing  industries not elsewhere 
classified. This list also is predictable, since it includes some of  the old 
import substitution industries, such  as pulp and paper, iron and steel, 
paints,  medicines,  soaps  and cosmetics, petroleum  and its derivatives, 
rubber  products,  and metal  products, which  have developed  for more 
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The noncompeting industries include : industrial chemicals; fertilizers; 
synthetic resins and manmade fibers; other chemical products; industrial 
nonferrous basic metals; engines; all types of  machinery and equipment; 
radio,  television,  and electrical appliances; railroad  equipment;  motor 
vehicles;  aircraft;  professional  and scientific equipment;  photographic 
equipment; watches; and musical instruments and sporting goods. Some 
of  these industries require, or include subgroups that require, very ad- 
vanced technology,  such  as many  industrial  chemicals,  fertilizers,  and 
aircraft. Others need a very well-developed industry for their inputs, such 
as synthetic resins  and fibers,  which  require  a  very  substantial petro- 
chemical industry, and engines and most machinery, which require good 
iron, steel, and other basic mineral industries. Still other groups depend 
upon very accurate equipment and skills not well developed in Colom- 
bia: for example, photographic equipment, watches, and musical instru- 
ments.  The radio,  television,  and  household  appliances industries,  in 
spite of  having a fairly long history in Colombia, are also noncompeting 
owing to some peculiar obstacles to their development. The small appli- 
ance industries have not been  able to grow rapidly  despite high  pro- 
tection because of  significant amounts of  smuggling. The large appliance 
industry has had particular  difficulties with the low-quality sheet metal 
produced  domestically.  Policies protecting the domestic steel industries 
require it to use this low-quality input. Many of  the other noncompeting 
branches fall into the machinery category. Colombia produces some sim- 
ple machines and parts, but it does not produce  machines that require 
the use  of  alloys or any sophisticated  metal process. Thus, in most of 
these branches, imports do not compete with domestic production, since 
there is little or none of  the latter. 
The only  manufacturing  branches  here identified  as  nontraded  or 
home goods are beer and soft drinks. Note also that construction, trans- 
portation,  utilities,  insurance  and  banking,  and  personal  services  are 
treated as home goods when calculating indirect requirements from the 
input-output  table. 
4.4.2 
Direct Requirements 
Direct requirements by skill category  (see Appendix B for discussion 
of  categories)  per unit of  DVA and IVA for trade categories are given 
in  table 4.7.  The weights used  in  aggregation  are value  added  in  do- 
mestic production. 
Observe that the results are as expected from the HOS model, given 
that  Colombia’s comparative  advantage lies in  labor-intensive  produc- 
tion.  Industries classified as  exportables had  ratios  of  blue-collar  and 
total employment to domestic value added twice as large as those of  the 
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importable group, and 50 percent higher than in the noncompeting in- 
dustries.  The same result holds, although the magnitude differs as one 
moves from DVA to IVA measures. The small change in the labor re- 
quirements for exportables and the larger changes for importables and 
noncompeting production  are due to the higher  effective protection  in 
these latter industries. 
Several comments are in  order concerning the interpretation  of  the 
results for noncompeting production. A priori, one would have expected 
these industries to have the lowest labor requirements. That they do not 
is due to several factors. First, the values are based upon domestic coef- 
ficients. Had these been  adjusted  as  suggested in chapter 1, they  un- 
doubtedly would have been lower. Second, there is a problem of  aggre- 
gation in these activities. Domestic production is not always comparable 
to imports, especially in machinery industries where Colombia imports 
machinery  and  electrical  equipment  not  produced  domestically  and 
produces  spare parts  and simple machines whose production  is labor- 
intensive.  Finally,  the  importable  group  contains  some  of  the  large 
capital-intensive import substitution projects developed during the sixties 
that  supply most of  what  the country  consumes.  Industries  in  which 
these projects are located then will have low labor coefficients and re- 
duce the overall importable estimates accordingly. 
In general, my  results indicate that exportables have  a much larger 
direct employment generation effect than the import substitution indus- 
tries.  Berry  and Diaz-Alejandro  (1977) and Diaz-Alejandro  (1976~) 
have suggested that manufactured exports are more capital-intensive than 
Table 4.7  Labor Intensity of  Manufacturing Production by Major Trade 
Categories, 1973 (Number of  Workers per Million 1970 Pesos 
of  Direct Value Added) 
~  ~~~~~~~~~  ~ 
Total  Blue- 
Employ-  Collar 
Trade Category  ment  Workers 
Per unit of domestic value added 
Export industries  29.1  23.9 
Noncompeting industriesa  21.7  16.3 
Per unit of  international value added 
Export industries  29.3  24.0 
Import-competing industries  18.0  13.1 
Import-competing industries  15.5  11.0 


















Source: Author’s computation  (see Appendix A). 
Note: Weights are DVA of  domestic production. 
aValues refer to domestic coefficients and are not adjusted in the manner suggested 
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the products sold in the domestic market. This hypothesis  is based on 
two facts:  the firms that export are larger than the average, and larger 
firms are more capital-intensive. However, I (Thoumi 1979) have sug- 
gested  that  the  shift  in  international  trade  strategies  toward  a  more 
open economy increased  the labor intensity of  Colombian manufactur- 
ing  as investment  moved  toward  the  most  labor-using  industries.  My 
evidence corroborates this latter suggestion: export industries were sub- 
stantially more  labor-using than  the import  substitution  ones.  Unfor- 
tunately, I could not investigate Berry’s and Diaz-Alejandro’s hypothe- 
sis more fully, since it was impossible to obtain data on labor coefficients 
by firm size within an industry.14 It is important to note, however, that 
the high degree of  disaggregation used here minimizes interindustry vari- 
ations in ratios of  employment to value added. Furthermore, the average 
labor coefficients for each industry are closer to the ratios of  the larger 
than of  the smaller plants, since the larger plants have more weight than 
the smaller ones. Thus, while more research  should  be encouraged in 
this field, it can be concluded with some confidence that export oriented 
products  are more  labor-intensive  per  unit  of  value  added  than the 
import substitution ones. 
The data available also gave a breakdown of  employment by sex. Out 
of  curiosity, I calculated the ratio of  male to female blue-collar workers 
(hereafter M/F ratio) for each trade category (again weighting by value 
added of  production). This ratio was smaller for exports  (1  8.7)  than 
for importables  (22.3) and noncompeting production  (24.5). When all 
foods and petrochemicals were excluded from the export branches, the 
M/F ratio dropped to 12.9. A comparison of  the actual exports of  1970 
and  1973 indicates that  Colombian  exports  were  becoming  even  less 
male-intensive; exports that were growing most rapidly tended to be sig- 
nificantly more female-intensive than exports on the average.15 
One characteristic of  Colombia is its lack of  centralization. It not only 
has many urban centers, but also has various geographic regions clearly 
separated from each other. Three mountain ranges, thick tropical jungles, 
swamps, and tropical diseases have made internal communications and 
trade difficult.16 Most of  the rivers are not easily navigated, and trans- 
portation routes were very primitive until recently. Even today there is 
no  overland  communication  with  Panama or  between  the  populated 
areas of  Colombia and the one-fifth of  the Colombian surface covered 
by  the Amazon jungle. The natural regionalization  of  the country has 
allowed the development of  ethnic subgroups with specific characteris- 
tics, including varying attitudes toward economic policies and entrepre- 
neurship.17 
To test whether  these regional  differences were important, I divided 
exports by  origin into five categories, then calculated blue-collar  labor 
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the “Llanos,77  or eastern prairies; Nariiio,  or the southern border; the 
northeast  border  (north  of  Santander); and the center of  the country. 
The first four regions’ exports to other countries can be considered  as 
“border” trade induced by low international  transportation costs. It is 
expected  that the center’s exports would be more labor-intensive  than 
border exports, since the center needs a greater comparative advantage 
to export in the presence of  high transportation costs. The data in table 
4.8 support this hypothesis:  blue-collar employment per unit of  domestic 
value added was higher for the center’s exports than for the exports of 
any of  the other regions. Exports from the Caribbean region were par- 
ticularly capital-intensive for 1970. However, when petrochemicals were 
eliminated,  the  coefficient for that region’s manufactured  exports  in- 
creased notably-to  20.0 in  1970 and 26.2  in  1973 for “all manufac- 
tures.,’ It is also apparent that  the difference between  the center’s co- 
efficient and the other regional  coefficients declined between  1970 and 
1973; this decline was probably caused by the development of  some very 
labor-intensive  exports in the border areas, especially in the Caribbean, 
where  offshore assembly industries were established  and increased ex- 
ports rapidly. 
Labor Skills and Salaries 
Skill  requirements  are likely  to  affect  Colombian  comparative  ad- 
vantage. Specifically, we expect export industries to be less skill-intensive 
than import-competing industries,  and exports to low-income countries 
to be more skill intensive than exports to high-income  countries. It is 
very difficult to define skills theoretically and to measure them empirically 
(see Appendix B) .  Nevertheless, I decided to use two proxies to measure 
skills; the average remuneration  per unit of  labor and the ratio of the 
number of  white- to blue-collar workers (hereafter the W/B ratio). 
Table 4.8  Labor Intensity of  Manufacturing Production by Export 
Industries According to Region of  Origins within Colombia, 
1970 and 1973 (Blue-Collar Employment per Million  1970 




All Manufactures  Processed Foods 
1970  1973  1970  1973 
~ 
Caribbean  11.5  20.0  6.1  14.6 
“Llanos”  19.6  24.5  19.3  24.5 
Nariiio  19.5  26.5  14.5  26.2 
Northeast border  19.8  17.4  19.8  17.4 
Center  22.1  26.8  24.8  28.3 
Source:  Author’s computations  (see Appendix A). 157  Trade Strategies, Employment, and Income in Colombia 
Table 4.9  shows average remuneration for various types of  labor in 
the trade categories for manufactures. Several interesting observations 
arise for these data. First, the average blue-collar total remuneration, 
which includes fringe benefits, is remarkably close in all categories, in- 
dicating  that  the  average  skill  of  blue-collar  workers  tends  to  be 
similar in every category. This finding is consistent with the beliefs of 
various entrepreneurs  and officials of  SENA,ls who  consider that the 
cost and time of  training good blue-collar workers for the various manu- 
facturing industries is  fairly  constant.  If  this  is  so,  the  value  of  the 
human capital of  the blue-collar workers in the various categories, and 
thus their skill levels, would tend to be constant. 
The same statement is true when comparing average white-collar re- 
muneration  in  the export,  import-competing, and noncompeting cate: 
gories. The variations in managerial remuneration are to be expected; 
these data  are much less reliable than  the  other  wage  data,  since in 
many plants it is impossible to separate the remuneration of  the man- 
ager from that of  the owners. However, high managerial salaries appear 
to be  concentrated in the import-competing and noncompeting indus- 
tries. These are the ones that benefit from the highest effective protection 
levels (see table 4.11). Since the rent created by protection is expected 
to rise as protection increases, managers are probably in a better posi- 
tion to capture a share of  this rent than blue- and white-collar workers, 
who face more competitive labor markets. 
The last column of  table 4.9 indicates that the W/B ratio increases as 
one goes from export to import-competing to noncompeting industries. 
This ratio reflects the average “skill content” of  the product as well as 
the degree of  competition of the markets in which the products are sold 
(see Appendix B)  .  These results are expected. Either Colombia exports 
Table 4.9  Indicators of  Skill Content by Trade Category, 1973 
Import-  Non- 
Export  competing  competing 
Industries  Industries  Industries 
Average annual remunerations 
All employees  26,200  28,580  28,220 
Blue-collar workers  22,590  21,750  2 1,250 
White-collar workers  38,050  38,470  40,510 
Management  40,320  53,340  52,530 
Ratio of  white-collar to 
blue-collar workers  .151  .291  .233 
Source:  Author’s computations (see Appendix A). 
*Average in  1970 pesos, weighted by  domestic value  added of production  in each 
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products with lower skill contents than those produced for the domestic 
market,  or domestic marketing  requires  a  larger number  of  salesmen 
than the international market, or both. 
4.4.3  Indirect Effects 
The only  way  to  derive  the indirect  effects  generated  by  export, 
import-competing,  and noncompeting  manufacturing  industries  was to 
use  the  Colombian  1970  input-output  matrix.  This  matrix  has  only 
thirty-one producing sectors; thus the level of  aggregation is much higher 
than that used in other parts of  this chapter. The nonfood manufacturing 
sector was  disaggregated  into  ten  branches. Agricultural-based  manu- 
facturing  was  disaggregated  into  seven  branches.  Six  industries  were 
treated as home goods : utilities, construction, transportation, communi- 
cations, insurance and banking, and personal services. The indirect ef- 
fects  on  output,  value  added,  and  total  wages  and  salaries  in  these 
sectors were estimated. It was not possible  to determine the effects on 
employment directly, because there were no employment data compati- 
ble with the matrix. 
Table 4.10 shows the indirect  effects in  pesos generated  by  a one- 
peso increase in direct value added. The import-competing HOS indus- 
tries have a much larger indirect effect on the economy than the export- 
oriented  HOS  industries.  Noncompeting  industries  fall  in  between, 
although they  are closer to the export sector. These results can be un- 
derstood when the nature of  the component industries is considered. The 
import-competing  branches  of  Colombian  manufacturing  include  the 
heaviest  (more capital-intensive)  industries  in  the country. These in- 
dustries are also the most energy- and water-intensive,  and the ones in 
which  transportation  costs  for their  inputs  are  the highest.  The high 
capital intensity also results in higher banking and insurance inputs. 
Table 4.10  Indirect Effects on Home Goods of  HOS 
Manufacturing  Production by Trade 
Categories, 1973 (Increase, in 1970 Pesos, 
Generated by One  Peso of Direct Value 
Added) 
Wages and 
Output  Value Added  Salaries 
Trade Category  (1  1  (2)  (3) 
Exports  .202  ,145  .076 
Noncompeting  .226  .163  .087 
Import-competing  .307  .221  .115 
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4.4.4 
Changes in the T Statistic and in the Composition of Trade Categories 
As I noted earlier, and as is set out in table 4.5, sixteen manufacturing 
industries changed classification between  1970 and  1973 according to 
the T statistic. Five of  them were food processors. These changes were 
probably  caused  by  changes  in  world  prices  and  domestic  subsidies. 
Meat and prepared animal feeds turned from importable to exportable as 
their world  prices increased. Canning, grain  mill products,  and  cocoa 
turned  from exportable into importable  production.  The only nonfood 
or tobacco branch that shifted from exportable to importable was “other 
textiles,” a relatively unimportant catchall branch. 
Apart from the latter and from food  and tobacco,  the only industry 
that become noncompeting was fertilizers and pesticides, which changed 
because of  the skyrocketing fertilizer prices in the world market in 1973. 
Some of  the classification changes seem to be the result not of  general 
policies but rather of  specific developments and particular policies. To- 
bacco is a very special case because fluctuating excise taxes in Colombia 
have  generated  great  swings  between  legal  and  illegal  imports.  The 
switch in  T  statistic between  1970 and  1973 happened  because in the 
latter year large amounts of  cigarettes were smuggled into the country. 
The high world  price of  steel in  1973 lowered  steel imports and even 
allowed the normally inefficient Paz del Rio steel mill to export some of 
its  products  so  that  the  sector moved  from the noncompeting to the 
importable category. Between 1970 and 1973, Conastil, an IFI-financed 
plant that produces  small fishing boats, began  to operate.  Because the 
production  of  these  small  boats  is  very  labor-intensive, Colombia de- 
veloped  a sizable amount of  exports, and this industry became import- 
competing rather than noncompeting. 
Changes in Manufacturing Industry Classification 
Effective Protection and Classification Changes 
Effective  protection  levels  could  also  have  affected  classification 
changes. Thus, importable  activities with low levels of  protection were 
more likely to become  exporters than more protected  ones. Likewise, 
highly  protected  export  sectors  were  more  likely to  become  import- 
competing than  less protected  ones.  Similar expectations hold  for the 
switches between  the import-competing and noncompeting categories. 
Unfortunately,  the available data on effective rates of  protection did 
not  cover  all  eighty  four-digit  manufacturing  branches,  and  thus  no 
formal test of  these hypotheses could be made. However, the data avail- 
able could  be used  to “suggest”  a relationship between  effective pro- 
tection  and the nature  of  the classification changes. Table 4.11 shows 
unweighted  effective  protection  averages  derived  from  estimates  for 
forty-eight  industries  assigned  to  various  categories.  For  those  forty- 160  Francisco E. Thoumi 
eight  industries,  this  table  shows  that  (1)  exports  had  the  lowest 
ERPs; (2) noncompeting industries had the highest ERPs; (3) indus- 
tries that were exporters in 1970 and became import-competing in 1973 
had  higher ERPs than  the  1973 export industries; and  (4) the  1970 
import-competing  industries  that  became  exporters  had  significantly 
lower protection than those classified as import-competing in 1973. 
The results strongly suggest that lower protection is associated with 
industries that became exporters, while changes in the opposite direction 
are associated with higher protection. 
Employment and Classification Changes 
We next made estimates of  labor coefficients and average remunera- 
tion  of  industries that  switched trade  categories from  1970 to  1973. 
These  are  shown  in  table  4.12.  Note  that  the  labor  coefficients of 
import-competing industries in 1970 that became exporters by 1973 were 
46 percent of  the  average of  1973 export branches  (see table 4.12). 
Also, the average remuneration paid in these industries was 32 percent 
higher than the average paid by export industries, as is shown by com- 
paring tables 4.12 and 4.9. These results are due to changes among the 
food industry group. 
When  nonfood industries were  considered separately  (column  2 of 
table 4.12), their labor requirements were 13 percent greater and their 
average remuneration 34 percent lower than similar averages for export- 
ables. Those export industries that became import-competing had lower 
labor  coefficients and  slightly lower than average remuneration, while 
the  noncompeting  industries that  turned  import-competing had  both 
Table 4.11  Effective Protection and Branches That Switched T Classification 
between 1970 and 1973 
Number of  Industries 
for Which Effective  Effective 
Protection Estimates  Protection, 
Are Available  1 970a 
All manufacturing  48  19.0% 
Export industries (1973)  16  9.2 
Export industries turned 
import-competing  4  16.0 
Import-competing industries 
Import-competing industries (1973)  16  18.2 
Noncompeting industries turned 
import-competing  1  15.1 
Noncompeting industries (  1973  )  _.  15  30.2 
Source:  Hutcheson  and Schydlowsky  ( 1976) and author’s computations. 
aunweighted averages. Corden method of  computation employed. 
turned exporters  4  11.0 Table 4.12  Labor  Intensity and  Average Remuneration in Industries That Changed T-Statistic Classification between 1970 and 1973 
Import-Competing Turned 
Exporter 
Export Industries Turned 
Import-Competing  Import- 
Noncompeting  Competing 
Excluding Food  Excluding  Turned Import-  Turned Non- 
Four  Food-  Competing-  competing- 
One Industry 
Nine  and Tobacco- 
Industries  Six Industries  Industries  One Industry  Two Industries 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Number of  workers 
per unit of  DVA 
Total employment  13.5  32.9 
Blue-collar workers  10.8  27.3 
White-collar workers  1.8  3.5 
Management  .9  2.1 
11.3  40.1  21.1 
8.5  33.1  15.9 
2.1  4.9  4.5 






All employees  34,580  17,240  19,220  19,320  3  3,400  39,150 
Blue-collar workers  27,950  14,940  14,810  13,410  39,720  27,330 
White-collar workers  48,840  29,630  3  1,670  28,770  38,220  50,180 
Management  47,250  23,210  38,070  28,790  56,660  72,230 
Source:  See text. 
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higher employment coefficients and higher remuneration; the importables 
that  turned  noncompeting  had  very low  employment  coefficients and 
very high remunerations. 
On the whole, then, if  we exclude the food sector (whose exports and 
imports are subject to fluctuations caused by domestic crop fluctuations 
and international  price changes), labor-intensive  manufacturing indus- 
tries were more likely to move in the “correct”  direction  (i.e., toward 
lower  T values). Movement in the opposite direction, however,  could 
not be statistically  verified  from the data analyzed here because,  as I 
noted above, only two nonfood industries moved to a higher  T classifi- 
cation. 
4.4.5  Employment and Skill Requirements Associated with Exports 
Direct Employment 
Table 4.13 gives labor coefficients per million pesos of  domestic and 
international  value added in the production  of  HOS goods exported to 
various country groupings.  The overall results  indicate that exports to 
developed  countries other than the United States generated significantly 
more employment per unit of  DVA than exports to LDCs. Surprisingly, 
the DVA labor coefficients for exports to the United States were remark- 
ably close to the corresponding coefficients for exports to LDCs. How- 
ever, when petrochemicals, sugar, and jewelry were excluded, exports to 
the United States were more labor-using than those of  LDCs. These re- 
Table 4.13  Labor Intensity of  HOS Exports by Destination, 1970 and 1973 




All  Petrochemicals, 
Manufactures  and Jewelry 
Destination  1970  1973  1970  1973 
Per unit of domestic value added 
United States  22.1 
Other developed countries  34.7 
Less developed countries  21.6 
Total exports  23.8 
Per unit of international value added 
United States  25.0 
Other developed countries  40.8 
Less developed countries  25.4 
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sults tend  to corroborate the notion that, in general, manufactured ex- 
ports to developed countries were produced by manufacturing branches 
that were more labor-intensive than those producing goods exported to 
LDCs. 
A  further breakdown  of  exports to LDCs indicated  that exports to 
Central  America  and  the  Caribbean  were  more  labor-intensive  than 
those to other LDCs or to the United States, using both IVA and DVA 
estimates. The high labor coefficients of  these exports can probably be 
explained by the fact that the Central American and Caribbean countries 
have  a  less  diversified  manufacturing  sector  than do the other Latin 
American  and  less  developed  countries  with  which  Colombia  trades. 
Also, the Central American and Caribbean countries have far fewer non- 
tariff barriers than do the other Latin American countries. To export to 
one of  the latter, it is necessary to find a commodity  not produced  in 
large quantities in that country.  Since the manufacturing structures of 
those countries are similar to Colombia’s, such a commodity necessarily 
must be either skill-intensive or capital-intensive. By contrast, there were 
at least some labor-intensive  goods produced in Colombia, as well as in 
other  Latin  American  countries,  that  could  be  exported  to  Central 
America. 
A comparison of  the 1970 and  1973 data in table 4.13 shows a sub- 
stantial  increase  in  the  employment  coefficients of  exports  over  that 
brief  period.  Similar  estimates  by  labor  category  (not  shown  in  the 
table)  indicate  further  that  managerial  labor  requirements  increased 
faster  than  those  for any  other job category,  followed  by  blue-collar 
employment and white-collar employment. (Average total labor require- 
ments per unit  of  DVA for all exports increased by  22.3 percent; the 
average for blue-collar employment increased by 24.2 percent; the aver- 
age for white-collar employment increased by 8.5 percent; and the aver- 
age  for  managerial  employment  increased  by  33.7  percent.)  These 
changes were principally due to the changing composition of  exports. 
We  pointed  out  earlier  that exports  were  less  male-intensive  than 
other trade categories in 1970. We calculated these ratios for 1970 and 
1973 exports by destination. These are given in table 4.14. Observe that 
exports to DCs other than the United States have much lower male in- 
tensities than exports to other destinations. When processed  foods and 
petrochemicals were excluded from the estimates, the ratio for exports to 
the United States fell by more than half and was only 60 percent of  that 
for exports to LDCs. These results suggest first that the male intensity of 
exports to DCs was substantially less than that of  exports to LDCs and 
that the difference widened from 1970 to 1973. That exports became less 
male-intensive overall from 1970 to 1973 is expected, since many labor- 
intensive exports were  also female-intensive,  as in garment production 
and assembly plants. 164  Francisco E. Thoumi 
Table 4.14  Ratio of  Male to Female Blue-Collar Workers in Colombian 
HOS Export Sectors, 1970 and 1973 
Sector 
Other  Less 
Total  United  Developed  Developed 
Exports  States  Countries  Countries 
All manufactures  1970  26.3  30.9  27.8  21.0 
1973  18.7  25.2  9.3  19.8 
All manufactures  1970  22.5  27.3  8.2  22.1 
except processed foods  1973  16.5  22.2  7.1  21.9 
All manufactures  1970  16.8  13.9  8.2  21.8 
except processed foods  1973  12.9  10.5  6.3  17.5 
and petrochemicals 
Source:  Author’s estimates. 
Skills and Salaries 
Table 4.15  presents results of  calculations of  white-  to blue-collar 
worker ratios by destination of  exports. Note that the ratio of  white- to 
blue-collar workers used  in  the  production  of  HOS exports was  sig- 
nificantly lower for exports to the United  States and other DCs than 
for exports to most other destinations. The highest ratio was registered 
for exports to Colombia’s neighbors, Venezuela and the Andean Group, 
with  which  Colombia had  active border  trade  and  integration agree- 
ments. From these ratios one can conclude that exports to the devel- 
oped  countries tended to  create a greater number of  blue-collar jobs 
per white-collar job than exports to the rest of  the world. Inasmuch as 
the W/B  ratio is a measure of  the skill content of  a product, one can 
also conclude that  exports to the  developed world  were  significantly 
less skill-intensive than exports to LDCs. 
The W/B ratio for total exports declined by approximately 15 percent 
between 1970 and 1973. The ratios for exports to all country groupings 
except “other Latin America” also declined. The sharpest drop (33 per- 
cent) took place in the Venezuelan ratio. The increase in the ratio of 
the rather limited exports to “other Latin America” was a moderate 9 
percent. Between 1970 and 1973 there was a very strong trend for low- 
skill exports to increase more rapidly than skill-intensive exports. The 
effect of  the export-oriented policies was  therefore larger on low-skill 
than on high-skill industrial branches. 
The data on remunerations in exports by  trade category (table 4.16) 
tend to confirm  the preceding conclusion, since the average  (in 1970 
pesos) for every export destination except other DCs declined substan- 
tially between 1970 and 1973. The table also shows that total manufac- 
tured exports to the United States produced the highest average remu- 
neration.  However,  when  sugar,  petrochemicals,  and  jewelry  were Table 4.15  Ratio  of  White-Collar to  Blue-collar  Workers in  Production of  HOS Exports,  1970 and 1973 
Central  Other  Other 
Other  America  Latin  Less 
Total  United  Developed  Vene-  Andean  and  American  Developed  Socialist 
Year  Exports  States  Countries  zuela  Group  Caribbean  Countries  Countries  Countries 
1970  .172  .157  .138  .245  .242  .169  .183  .198  .136 
1973  .150  .137  .129  .194  .211  .155  .201  .191  .131 
Source:  Author’s estimates. 
Note: Unweighted average of  the ratios for the five alternative classifications of  HOS  exports as defined in text (section 4.4.1). 166  Francisco E. Thoumi 
excluded, the average generated by exports to the United States dropped 
to the second lowest position, higher only than that for exports to other 
DCs. Excluding the three industries mentioned, we  can conclude that 
exports to DCs were less skill-intensive than exports to LDCs. Also, as 
the ratio of  white- to blue-collar workers could be an indication of  the 
degree  of  competition  in  Colombia's  markets,  the  data  suggest  that 
industries that  exported to the DCs  tended  to have more competitive 
markets than those that exported to LDCs. 
4.4.6 
Table 4.17 shows the total, blue-collar  and white-collar  employment 
per million dollars of  international value added of  imports of  manufac- 
tures. The labor coefficients used here are derived from the United States 
census. They are assumed to reflect international coefficients. One inter- 
esting result is the similarity of  most of  the employment coefficients for 
the various country groupings. This may be due to the level of aggrega- 
tion  used,  since  the higher  the level of  aggregation,  the  more  similar 
will  be labor  requirements  for  imports  from various sources.  On the 
average,  the labor  intensity  of  total imports  declined  slightly between 
1970 and  1973, although this decline was  not statistically  significant. 
However, the labor intensity of  imports from some particular  countries 
did change markedly. Imports from the Andean Group were 33 percent 
less labor-intensive  than the overall average in 1970 but  exceeded the 
average by  11 percent in 1973. This change can be readily explained as 
the result of  the Andean Group import liberalization program begun in 
197 1, according to which Colombia eliminated nontariff restrictions on 
imports from Common Market members and also eliminated tariffs for 
a special subset of  imports from Bolivia and Ecuador, the least devel- 
oped Andean Group countries. This special subset included  some very 
Factor Proportions in Colombian Imports 
Table 4.16  Average Total Employment Remuneration in HOS Exports by 
Destination, 1970  and 1973 (in 1970 Pesos) 
Sector 
Other  Less 
United  Developed  Developed 
Total  States  Countries  Countries 
All manufactures  1970  34,830  42,650  27,990  28,930 
1973  27,000  37,340  18,070  26,820 
All manufactures  1970  32,410  40,760  25,960  28,930 
except sugar  1973  25,130  35,520  17,180  26,820 
All manufactures except sugar,  1970  21,180  20,850  15,580  28,930 
petrochemicals,  and jewelry  1973  19,520  18,680  15,710  26,820 
Source:  Author's computations. 
Note: The computations in this table relate to total exports of  HOS goods, includ- 
ing those originating in import-competing and noncompeting industries. Table 4.17  Labor Intensity of  Imports of Manufactures, 1970 and 1973 (Number of Workers per Million Dollars of  International 
Value Added of  Imported Goods) 
Central  Other  Other 
Other  America  Latin  Less 
Total  United  Developed  Vene-  Andean  and  American  Developed  Socialist 
Imports  States  Countries  zuela  Group  Caribbean  Countries  Countries  Countries 
Total  1970  43.9  42.8  46.2  46.3  32.0  43.2  43.4  45.3  45.4 
employmenta  1973  42.7  42.5  42.5  42.5  47.2  35.0  44.1  55.4  38.5 
Blue-collar  1970  32.3  30.8  34.3  37.1  25.2  32.7  30.4  36.0  36.1 
employment  1973  30.6  30.4  30.0  32.6  37.8  24.6  31.8  45.2  28.4 
White-collar  1970  11.6  11.9  11.9  9.2  6.8  10.5  13.0  9.3  9.3 
employment  1973  12.1  12.1  12.5  9.9  9.4  10.4  12.3  10.2  10.1 
Source: Author's  computations. 
aTotal employment is exclusive of  management. 168  Francisco E. Thoumi 
labor-intensive items such as cotton jackets. Other large changes in labor 
coefficients were found in imports from Central America and the Carib- 
bean  and from  socialist countries, which  became less labor-intensive, 
and in imports from other LDCs, which became more labor-intensive. 
Colombia’s manufacturing sector is well diversified. More than 90 per- 
cent of  manufactured consumer goods sold in the country are either pro- 
duced or assembled domestically behind tariff walls. The greater part of 
imports is made up of  intermediate and capital goods. Thus, most manu- 
factures typically produced by LDCs are not imported. This is probably 
why  the  average labor coefficients for most  of  the country groupings 
were close to the overall average. And when tariff  rates on some con- 
sumer goods items are reduced for certain countries, imports of  such 
goods from those countries increased. This explains why  special tariff 
concessions to Ecuador and Bolivia had  an effect on their exports to 
Colombia and thus on the labor coefficients. 
4.4.7  Employment and Income Distribution Effects of 
International Trade Strategies 
Given the data available, it was impossible to estimate the effects of 
various trade strategies on the size distribution of  income of  Colombia. 
However, the evidence collected provided  indications on which social 
groups tended to benefit the most from the development of  exportable, 
import-competing  and noncompeting manufacturing activities. Table 4.18 
provides a summary of  data relevant to the income distribution effects 
of  the manufacturing groups considered. 
The  results  suggest  that  the  average compensation in  the  import- 
competing sector was slightly higher than  in  the noncompeting sector 
and 9 percent higher than in the export sector. The higher remuneration 
in the import-competing sector was due to higher management compen- 
sation and not to higher wages and salaries for blue- and white-collar 
workers (see table 4.9). 
Direct employment per unit of  value added generated by  the export 
sector was  almost twice  that  created by  the import-competing sector. 
The employment difference was  almost totally accounted for by  blue- 
collar workers. 
Total remuneration as a percentage of  value  added was  highest by 
far in  the  export  sector, followed by  the  noncompeting and  import- 
competing sectors. This ranking was unchanged if  indirect salary effects 
were taken into account. On this basis, the wage  and salary share in 
value  added was  approximately 60 percent higher  in  exports than in 
importables. 
In sum, it seems clear that, in terms of  direct effects, export-oriented 
manufacturing created substantially more blue-collar jobs than import- 
competing manufacturing; wages in both sectors were almost equal; and Table 4.18  Employment and Labor Remuneration in Four Trade Categories, 1973 
Total  Blue-Collar  White-collar  Total Remuneration 
Workers  Workers  Workers  Ratio of  Average  as Percentage of  DVA 
per Million  per Million  per Million  White-to  Remuner- 
Pesos of  Pesos of  Pesos of  Blue-Collar  ation  Direct  Direct and 
DVAa  DVA  DVA  Employment  ( 1970 Pesos)  Only  Indirectb 
Trade Category  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Import-competing  1  5.5  11.0  3.2  .291  28,580  44.3  45.7 
Exports  29.1  23.9  3.6  .151  26,200  76.2%  73.2% 
Noncompeting  21.7  16.3  3.8  .233  28,220  61.2  60.1 
Source:  Author’s computations. 
Note:  Columns 1 through 6 relate to direct employment only, whereas column 7 includes also indirect  employment. 
BIncluding management; see tables 4.7  and 4.9. 
bDirect plus  indirect remuneration  divided by  direct plus  indirect  value added; i.e.  (column 6 +  column 3 of  table 4.10) f ( 1 + column 
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total labor remuneration was higher in exports. This last point was still 
valid  after  measurable  indirect effects were  taken  into account. Thus, 
given the evidence  available,  it  can be concluded  that emphasis upon 
export promotion produced more egalitarian effects on income distribu- 
tion than emphasis upon import substitution in the period before 1967. 
4.5  Conclusions 
My  analysis has shown that export-oriented  manufacturing branches 
were  significantly more labor-intensive  than the import-competing and 
noncompeting branches.  This does not mean  that  some of  Colombia’s 
exports have not been and are not now capital-intensive, since examples 
of  such exports can be found. On the average, however, the results clearly 
showed that exports were more labor-intensive. Furthermore, the results 
showed that, as the economy became more open, the labor intensity of 
exports increased. As one would expect, exports to LDCs were less labor- 
intensive and less female-intensive than exports to DCs. On the import 
side, a strong similarity was found in the labor intensity of  imports from 
DCs to LDCs. 
The opening of  the economy that began in 1967 also had an effect on 
the shares of  NRB and HOS goods in exports. With the economy open- 
ing, the comparative advantage of  the country in labor-intensive produc- 
tion was observable in the substantially  higher increase in HOS export 
production relative to NRB exports; the strength of  this trend was found 
even in the presence of  increasing commodity prices. 
Estimated  indirect  effects on home goods production  also gave ex- 
pected results. Home goods indirect labor affected import-competing in- 
dustry more than other sectors, since they are more intensive in the use 
of  energy, transportation, and banking services, all of  which are relatively 
labor-using. Even including indirect effects, however, production for ex- 
port  still provided  appreciably greater  employment  opportunities than 
import-competing production  insofar as can be judged  by  the relative 
share of  labor remuneration in total value added. 
Export production had more egalitarian effects on income distribution 
than import-competing production. This was true even when the indirect 
effects on home goods were taken into account. 
In general, all these results are expected in an economy that responds 
well to price incentives.  They  suggest that  any  incentive-oriented  em- 
nomic policy (import substitution or export promotion) will be effective, 
since  Colombian  entrepreneurs  appear to respond  well  to  traditional 
policy  instruments.  However,  given  Colombia’s employment problems 
and  experience with  import  substitution,  my  results  provide  a  strong 
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Appendix A: Data Sources 
Employment, Skills, and Value-Added Data 
The 1970 census of  manufactures was used to obtain employment, skills, 
and value-added data at the four-digit level of  the ISIC-I1 classification. 
The census provides  information  on the  number  of  various  types of 
workers employed in manufacturing: white-collar, blue-collar,  and man- 
agers.  Unfortunately,  no  information  is  available  on the number  of 
hours worked; thus all labor measures used  in this study are based on 
the number of  workers and not on the flow of  services of  labor. 
The census  data were  used  to derive value-added  figures for  each 
four-digit sector. The value-added  figures were obtained by subtracting 
from the output  data all  intermediate goods  purchases  plus  payments 
for services and raw materials. No deduction for depreciation was made, 
since no data on fixed capital are available.  The value-added  data are 
used as a proxy for capital stock because it was impossible to find data 
on capital. 
No direct information on labor skills was available. Data on salaries 
and  wages and on ratios of  white- to blue-collar  workers  are used  as 
proxy  variables for skills  (see Appendix B), as is the female-intensity 
of  different sectors (with the strong presumption that under prevailing 
conditions women  are,  on  the  average,  significantly less  skilled  than 
men). 
Trade Data 
International trade data were obtained from the trade yearbooks for 
1970 and 1973 (DANE 1970-73).  All exports and imports of  Colom- 
bia were reclassified at the four-digit  ISIC-I1 level to make them com- 
parable to the manufacturing census data. 
Following our beliefs about the relevance of  the various trade partners 
of Colombia, the trade data were also assembled according to the fol- 
lowing country groupings : ( 1  ) the United States, the largest single trade 
partner  of  Colombia;  (2)  all  the other developed  capitalist countries; 
(3) Venezuela, a country with which there is a large amount of  trade, 
both legal and illegal; (4) the Andean Group countries  (notice that in 
1973 Venezuela had not joined  and Chile was still a Common Market 
member and thus was included in this category); (5) the Central Ameri- 
can and Caribbean  countries, which have generally followed less pro- 
tective  policies  than  other  LDCs  and  with  which  Colombia  has  low 
natural  barriers,  since the Caribbean supplies a cheap transport route; 
(6) the rest of  Latin America  (all these countries are members of the 
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scheme that has developed a few bilateral and multilateral trade agree- 
ments in which Colombia participates);  (7) the other LDCs; (8) the 
socialist European and Asiatic countries with which all trade takes place 
through bilateral  agreements and where  natural resource  endowments 
play a lesser role in determining the composition of  trade. 
Other Data 
Two other main sources of  data were used in this study: the Colom- 
bian input-output table for 1970, and an effective protection study done 
by  Thomas  Hutcheson  and  Daniel  Schydlowsky  (1976)  with  1970 
data. The 1970 input-output table is unfortunately very aggregated, with 
only thirty-one sectors. Therefore, indirect effects could be determined 
only in a very approximate way, and estimates are given here only for 
output, value added, and wages and salaries. No estimates are offered 
for employment, since, for example, the indirect employment effects of 
the manufacturing branches of  the 3111 to 3119 ISIC codes are esti- 
mated  only  globally  and  cannot  be  broken  down  by  manufacturing 
branch. 
The effective protection study is of  very high quality. It is based on 
a survey of  product prices and thus reflects actual domestic prices, not 
estimated prices. The study not only takes into account tarifEs, licenses, 
and other foreign trade barriers, but also includes capital and other sub- 
sidies that affect the level of  protection provided by  the government’s 
intervention in  the market mechanism. Unfortunately, the survey pro- 
vides effective protection data for only fifty-six branches of  the eighty 
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Table 4.A.1  Nominal and Effective Protection of  Manufactures in Colombia, 
1969 
ISIC 
No.  Manufacturing Branch 
Nominal  Effective  Trade 
Pro-  Pro-  Cate- 
tection  tection  gory* 
3 11  1 Slaughtering, preparing, and preserving of meat 
3 112 Manufacture of dairy products 
3 113 Canning of fruits and vegetables 
3 114 Canning, preserving, and processing of fish 
31 15  Manufacture of  vegetable and animal oils 
3  11  6 Grain mill products 
3 117 Manufacture of bakery products 
3 11  8 Sugar factories and refineries 
31 19 Manufacture of  cocoa, chocolate, etc. 
3121 Manufacture of food products n.e.c. 
3 13  1 Distilling, rectifying, and blending spirits 
3 132 Wine industries 
3140 Tobacco manufactures 
3211 Spinning, weaving, and finishing of  textiles 
3212 Manufacture of made-up textile goods except 
32 13 Knitting mills 
3215 Cordage, rope, and twine industries 
3219 Textiles n.e.c. 
3220 Wearing apparel except footwear 
3231 Tanneries and leather finishing 
3233 Production of leather and leather substitutes, 
3240 Footwear, except vulcanized or plastic footwear 
331 1 Sawmills, planing, and other wood mills 
3319 Wood and cork products n.e.c. 
3320 Furniture and fixtures 
341 1 Pulp, paper, and paperboard 
3412 Containers and boxes of  paper and paperboard 
351 1 Basic industrial chemicals except fertilizers 
351  3 Snythetic resins, plastic materials and manmade 
3521 Paints, varnishes, and lacquers 
3522 Drugs and medicines 
3523 Soap and cleaning preparation, perfumes, 
cosmetics, etc. 
3529 Chemical products n.e.c. 
3530 Petroleum refineries 
3540 Products of petroleum and coal 
3551 Tire and tube industries 
3559 Rubber products n.e.c. 
and crustaceans 
wearing apparel 
except footwear and wearing apparel 
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Table 4.A.1-continued 
ISIC 
No.  Manufacturing Branch 
Nominal  Effective  Trade 
Pro-  Pro-  Cate- 
tection  tection  gorya 
~  ~~~~~  ~  ~ 
3620 Glass and glass products 
3692 Cement, lime, and plaster 
3699 Nonmetallic mineral products n.e.c. 
3710 Iron and steel, basic industries 
3720 Nonferrous metal, basic industries 
381 1 Cutlery, hand tools, and general hardware 
3812 Manufactures of furniture and fixtures, 
3813 Structural metal products 
38 19 Fabricated metal products, except machinery 
3822 Agricultural machinery and equipment 
3824 Special industrial machinery and equipment, 
3830 Electrical industrial machinery and apparatus 
3832 Radio, television, and communication 
primarily of metal 
and equipment n.e.c. 
except metal and woodworking machinery 
equipment and apparatus 
3833 Electrical appliances and housewares 
3839 Electrical apparatus and supplies n.e.c 
3843 Motor vehicles 
3844 Motorcycles and bicycles 
3901 Jewelry and related articles 


























































Source:  Hutcheson  and Schydlowsky  (  1976), and Hutcheson’s  unpublished  data. 
Code: X =  exportable,  M =  importable,  NC =  noncompeting  production. 
Appendix B : A Note on Labor Skills and Their 
Measurement in Colombia 
The decision to introduce skills in a study of  this nature is based on the 
belief that there exist various types of  labor that are important in deter- 
mining total  output, length of  time  of  the production  process,  and  so 
forth. A priori, these various skills or qualities of  labor are not defined 
in the same dimension,  and thus they  are not directly comparable; for 
example, the skills of a wood-carver and those of  a truck driver are not 
directly comparable. To compare these various skills it is necessary  to 
use a function that weights all the skills being considered. The theory of 
human  capital  provides  such  a  weighting  function,  since  it  offers  a 
method of  valuing each type of  labor. If we rely basically on the assump- 175  Trade Strategies, Employment, and Income in Colombia 
tion that the supply of  different types of  skills is highly elastic, under 
competitive conditions, the wage paid each type of  labor can be inter- 
preted as representing the value of  the raw labor used  (unskilled time) 
plus the value of  the skills embedded in marginal individuals providing 
the labor services. Total labor remuneration can thus be used as a proxy 
measure for the quantity of  skills used in a production process. 
Wages and salaries have  to be used  carefully  in Colombia, because 
they are somewhat distorted  by  the following factors:  minimum wage 
laws, extensive labor unionization in the manufacturing sector, and pos- 
sible  observation  of  disequilibrium  conditions.  Minimum  wage  laws 
establish a floor for wages in all areas of  the country and assign differen- 
tiated wages by  region  and economic sector  (agriculture  vs.  manufac- 
ture). The degree of  compliance with these laws varies a great deal, and 
there is no way  to measure the degree of  evasion. However, minimum 
wage laws are generally enforced in the large cities and in manufactur- 
ing establishments with more than ten employees. Owing to the persis- 
tent inflation experienced in Colombia and to the lag in the adjustment 
in minimum wage floors, minimum wages have not always been binding. 
It is frequently stated that labor unions used the minimum wage levels 
as benchmarks in their salary demands. To conclude, while it is widely 
believed  that  minimum  wage laws and  unions have an effect on wage 
levels, there is no quantification  of  the magnitude of  this effect. 
Certain wages and salaries in Colombia are likely to be at levels dif- 
ferent from what they would be in long-run equilibrium. 3n  an economy 
where  many  new  products  and plants  are developed  every year,  some 
types of  labor will likely be in short supply. Individuals with the neces- 
sary skills are in a position to command salaries well above their social 
replacement costs, which in the long run are determined by the costs of 
training. While these conditions point out the difficulties in using wages 
and salaries as a proxy for skill levels in Colombia, they were nonethe- 
less used in the absence of  a better measure. 
Census data were used to obtain labor remuneration  for three types 
of  workers:  blue-collar,  white-collar,  and  managerial.  The blue-collar 
and white-collar  data are believed to be of  good quality. However, the 
managerial data are of  lower quality, since in many  small plants there 
is  no separation  between  ownership and  management. Thus the man- 
agerial remuneration is only an accounting cost and does not necessarily 
represent what the manager actually gets. Furthermore, in the corporate 
sector many managers  get part of  their  salary in kind so that they can 
avoid paying income taxes. These payments in kind  are not included in 
the data. 
The ratio of  white- to blue-collar  workers is also taken  as  a proxy 
for skills  used  in  production,  because it  is  believed  that white-collar 
workers are employed in jobs that are not directly related to the produc- 176  Francisco E. Thoumi 
tion process but arise from market imperfections. Such jobs include those 
held by  employees who  are used to get import and export licenses, to 
influence price controls, and so forth. Also, many sales jobs have been 
created  by  oligopolistic  market  structures  and  product-diff erentiation 
advertising, and other sales efforts have to be made to maintain a plant’s 
market share, To  summarize, the white-collar workers employed by  a 
plant include not only engineers and production workers but also non- 
production-related  employees.  Therefore  the ratio  of  white-  to blue- 
collar workers reflects the quality and skills of the production supervisory 
staff as well as market imperfections and government intervention. Un- 
fortunately, there is no way  to separate these three elements. 
In this study, therefore, two skill measures have been used: the level 
of labor remuneration and the ratio of  white- to blue-collar workers. As 
I pointed out above, both have to be employed with reservations. Both 
are used as they reflect different skill requirements of  the various pro- 
duction processes. Salaries can be used to compare various skills within 
a labor classification, that is, skill differences among blue-collar workers 
of various industries. The W/B  ratio can  be used  to reflect different 
supervisory, research, and engineering requirements of  the various manu- 
facturing branches. 
Notes 
1. In  some  respects  1973  was  not  a  typical  year:  international  inflation  was 
running high, and it was a boom year for the world economy during which “short- 
ages” of  many commodities developed. These factors probably affected Colombian 
trade in  1973, since imports of  NRB  commodities were discouraged while exports 
of such commodities were encouraged  by  high  prices.  Furthermore, shortages of 
intermediate  goods  hampered  domestic  production  of  some manufactured  goods 
and, thus, exports  of  manufactures. 
2.  A  more  detailed  overview  of  Colombian  development  can  be  found  in 
Diaz-Alejandro  (19763). 
3.  For  a  complete  discussion  of  the  exchange  regime,  see  Diaz-Alejandro 
(1976b). 
4. An  excellent  analysis  of  the Colombian  trade system  and history  in  recent 
years is found in Diaz-Alejandro  (19763). 
5.  These biases were still present in 1969, the date for which good effective pro- 
tection estimates exist. 
6.  The subsidy was also income tax free. 
7. Recently  there have  been  some drastic  changes  in  Colombia  that have  im- 
proved the employment picture. The description in this section pertains to the situ- 
ation prevailing during the period to which the study applies-the  1960s and early 
1970s.  Several  factors have  altered  the  outlook:  (1) Colombia  has  had  one of 
the most dramatic declines in rate of  population  growth of  any country, with the 
rate falling from about 3.3 percent in the 1950s and early 1960s to less than 2 per- 177  Trade Strategies, Employment, and Income in Colombia 
cent in the late 1970s; and (2) the boom produced by the high coffee prices, and 
the development  of  marijuana and cocaine industries,  has produced  a very  large 
source of  income, which in turn has had a large effect on employment. 
8.  See Conroy  (1976)  for a detailed analysis of this phenomenon;  data men- 
tioned here are taken from his study. 
9. Protectionist  policies  have  changed  since  these  studies  were  made,  as  the 
1970s have witnessed a continuation  of  the trade liberalization  policies begun  in 
1967. However,  the effective protection  estimates for 1969  Are  suitable here be- 
cause  they  are only  one year  away  from  the  manufacturing  census used  in  the 
latter part of  this chapter. 
10. This figure  (0.4) is  lower  than  the  one  used  to  divide  import-competing 
and noncompeting  industries in many other country studies presented in this VOI- 
ume.  The T  statistic for Colombia was  clearly bimodal  for values between  zero 
and one, with modes at about 0.25 and 0.65. Furthermore, most of the noncompet- 
ing industries are either metal-manufacturing  branches that contain a great number 
of products with different patterns of  behavior or industries in which imports tend 
to be quite different from domestic products and thus are noncompeting. 
11. The Colombian  agricultural  sector has not been  studied  extensively;  how- 
ever, the interested reader could look at Junguito (1974). 
12. For example, the finding that manufactured  exports are on the average more 
labor-intensive  than import-competing manufactured products  cannot be extended 
to  the  agricultural  sector, where  the opposite  may  take place  (further  discussed 
below). 
13. For an explanation  of  the rationale  for the  geographic  divisions  used,  see 
Appendix A. 
14. The size breakdown is not available at the four-digit level of disaggregation 
used  in this essay. Such detail would violate the confidentiality of  the census data, 
since it would allow the identification of  many firms. 
15.  This issue is discussed further below. See table 4.14. 
16. These  obstacles,  in  the  view  of  many  historians,  played  a  major  role in 
the  dissolution of  the  Gran Colombia,  which  in  the nineteenth  century  included 
what  today are Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela. 
17. See  the  works  of  Hagen  (1962)  and  Lopez-Toro  (1970), in  which  the 
regional development of  entrepreneurial  abilities  in Antioquia  are studied. 
18. Servicio  Nacional  de  Aprendizaje,  a  government  organization  in  charge 
of  a large vocational training program in Colombia. 
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